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 Footloose capital and productive public services 
 
By Pasquale Commedatore Ingrid Kubin and Carmelo Petraglia 
 
1. Introduction 
Brakman et al. (2005) claim that the European Cohesion Policy is incoherent since it seems 
sometimes targeting agglomeration of industrial activities in core regions, but more often 
stimulating their relocation in peripheral ones. Such a criticism provides a motivation to 
analyse policy issues in NEG models, whose main focus is on the determinants of spatial 
location of manufacturing industry 1. However, the incorporation of public expenditures in 
New Economic Geography (NEG) models represents a very recent theoretical advance. 
Providing the full picture of the working of both agglomeration and dispersion forces 
induced by the policy measures aimed to make backward regions more attractive for 
investors might be helpful for the design of effective policies aimed at promoting a 
sustained catching-up process across UE regions. 
The impact of public expenditures on the location decisions of firms has been studied 
within a few variants of NEG models. 2 In particular, in a companion paper (Commendatore 
et al., 2007), we consider a two-regions Constructed Capital (CC) model, i.e. a Footlose 
Capital (FC) model with the additional feature of creation and destruction/depreciation of 
capital goods. In that paper our main focus is on industrial location and welfare effects of 
productive public services provision under the assumption of endogenous capital. The 
                                                 
1 As the authors point out, on the one hand, billions of euros are devoted to the financing of infrastructure 
projects in core regions; on the other hand, the bulk of the available funds are directed towards lagging regions 
in the attempt to achieve a “balanced spread of economic activity” (Brakman et al., 2005). 
2 See, in particular, the contributions of Martin and Rogers (1995), Trionfetti (1997), Brülhart and Trionfetti 
(2004), Brakman et al. (2007) and Commendatore et al. (2007). For an overview on the main results in the 
literature the reader is referred to Commendatore et al. (2007).  
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government uses tax revenues to purchase capital goods to use in the production of freely 
available public services. Hence, public policy can affect production in the manufacturing 
sector via its impact on factors productivity. We show in that paper that the interplay of two 
effects determines the final impact of an increase in productive public spending in the 
backward region on the spatial distribution of firms: the productivity effect and the demand 
effect. On the one hand, an increase in the provision of public services in one region lowers 
labour input requirement and lead firms to relocate there (productivity effect); on the other 
hand it could favor dispersion via a change in the relative market size (demand effect). As a 
result, whether or not higher provision of public services leads firms to relocate in the 
backward region will depend upon the financing scheme of public expenditure. It is shown 
that the demand effect is negligible if the government lets the richer region’s tax payers 
contribute on the basis of their contribution capacity. 
In this paper we aim at providing further insights on how the interplay of the above 
mentioned productivity and demand effects influences industrial location. In order to do so, 
we consider a much simpler analytical framework, which allows fully characterizing the 
dynamic behavior of capital movements in response to variations in the degree of trade 
freeness and in the provision of public services.  
We deal with a FC model without an investment sector. In the standard Core-Periphery 
(CP) model (Krugman, 1991) it is assumed that mobile workers spend their incomes locally 
and imperfectly competitive firms tend to locate in the biggest market, enforcing the so-
called “home market” effect which leads to agglomeration. The “cost of living” effect – 
goods are cheaper in regions with higher concentration of industrial firms – also favors 
agglomeration. On the other hand, the market-crowding or competition effect – the presence 
of an increasing number of competing firms lowers retail sales and wages – favors 
dispersion. The standard result of the model is that, at a sufficiently low level of trade costs 
– the so-called “break point” –, when a migration shock – driven by real wage differentials 
– occurs, agglomeration forces overpower dispersion ones in such a way to end up with the 
concentration of all industry in one region. As a result, complete agglomeration in one 
region is a stable equilibrium. 
The FC model departs from the CP model for two crucial assumptions: a fixed capital 
requirement for each variety of the differentiated good and workers international 
immobility. In contrast with Krugman (1991), the mobile factor (capital) earnings are 
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repatriated and spent where the capital owner reside. Therefore the typical CP feature of 
demand linked circular causality – production changes brought about by factor movements 
yield expenditure switching that in turn generate further production changes – does not 
arise. Furthermore, since costs-of-living are irrelevant to the production location decisions 
of capitalists, the cost-linked circular causality of the CP model – shifts in production alter 
prices inducing workers migration with further production shifting – is eliminated. Hence, 
the CP outcome of catastrophic agglomeration in one region is ruled out; however, 
agglomeration still occurs due the working of the home market effect. 
As policy is concerned, we assume that the government decides on the levels of the public 
services in both regions and on the contribution of the two regions to its financing (which 
may not be proportional to the amount of the public services provided to the region). We 
assume that public services are produced by using the agricultural commodity and increase 
the productivity in the local manufacturing sector, not having any impact on private utility. 
Extending Commendatore et al. (2007), we pay attention to the dynamic structure of the 
model. First, we fully characterize the dynamic process underlying capital movements and 
analyze the long-run equilibrium given as fixed point of the capital mobility dynamics for 
different degrees of trade freeness. Second, we study the impact of the provision of public 
services on the long-term behavior of the regional shares of capital. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides empirical background on recent 
trends of public investment and critical factors influencing foreign direct investment (FDI) 
in European regions. In section 3 we introduce the assumption of our model; section 4 
presents the full model short-run structure, explicitly specifying the capital migration 
process. Section 5 deals with the dynamics of the model, studying the stability properties of 
core-periphery and interior equilibria, while section 6 presents the decomposition of the 
final impact of the provision of public services on the long run allocation of capital across 
regions into the productivity and the demand effects. We run such a policy experiment 
under different degrees of economic integration. Finally, section 7 concludes. 
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2. Empirical Background 
In order to enhance the attractiveness of backward regions, European regional policy 
heavily relies on public investment, viewed as “contributing directly to economic growth 
and strengthening the productive potential of the economy”. Public investment includes 
investment in human capital and infrastructure as well as expenditure on education and 
training aimed at improving the skills of the work force.  
As documented by the European Commission (2007), in recent years public investment in 
EU countries has experienced a declining path at the national level.3 The share of public 
investment to GDP in the EU15 declined from 2.9% in 1993 to 2.4% in 2005. On the other 
hand, public expenditure at regional and local levels has been increasing annually by 3.6% 
between 2000 and 2005, faster than total public expenditure (2.4%). The main factors 
explaining this declining pattern are “the general tendency towards a shrinking public 
sector, the increased involvement of the private sector in public sector capital projects and 
the pressure to reduce overall public expenditure to comply with rules on the budget 
deficit”. 
Conversely, the management of public investment has gradually being decentralised to 
regional and local levels. As a result, the share of regional and local authorities in public 
investment increased in average in all UE countries, underlying the higher responsibility of 
local government in the allocation of development-related public spending. 
In the view of the European policy maker, FDI flows are interpreted as a critical factor for 
the development of lagging regions, particularly for the new member States, representing 
the “primary way in which the productivity gap between the industries and services located 
there and those in the rest of EU can be narrowed” (European Commission, 2007, pag. 73). 
Policies are hence targeted to enhance the attractiveness of regions via the improvement of 
basic and ICT infrastructures and the education of the work force. However, what we refer 
to as the demand effect induced by public spending – public expenditure changes imply 
 
3 These figures are referred to “gross fixed capital formation” (dwellings, other buildings and structures, 
machinery and equipment, and computer software).  
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changes in regional market size – seems to be neglected by the policy maker according to 
whom “policy cannot affect factors such as national market size” (European Commission, 
2007, p. 74). The neglecting of such an issue provides further motivation to our study. 
Data on FDI account for a heterogeneous set of transactions, only part of which relating to 
actual location decisions. However, the scarcity of available alternative information makes 
them a natural proxy for capital movements across borders (Buettner, 2002).  
FDI intensity – measured in terms of employees in foreign owned firms in relation to the 
total number of employees – across European regions is shown in figure 1. Regions with the 
largest shares are concentrated in the UK, Germany and France, while Spain only has two 
regions with a large share (Madrid and Navarra). The regions bordering France and the 
Atlantic also tend to have larger than average shares. The highest concentration is reached 
in Randstad regions, in Belgium, in Brussels and most of the Flemish regions and in Ireland 
(in the regions in which Dublin and Cork are situated). In contrast, all the new Member 
States, Finland, Greece, Portugal and southern Italy all have below average shares. 
Figures 2-5 report estimated relative importance of factors that can potentially make 
backward European regions more attractive for foreign investors (Copenhagen Economics, 
2006). Figures refer to four subsets of regions: “Eastern Europe”, “cohesion countries”, 
“regions facing weaknesses in competitiveness and employment” and “remote regions”. In 
each case, figures are constructed for the most attractive regions within the respective 
subset. The common pattern is that even if most attractive regions in each subset seem to be 
appealing for foreign investors, they still suffer from strong weaknesses with respect to the 
EU27 average, especially with respect to infrastructure and human capital. 
 
 
 Figure 1: FDI intensity in 2004 (Employees in foreign firms as % of total number of 
employees) 
 
Note: The darker the areas, the higher the intensity if FDI 
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2006) 
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Figure 2: Regional attraction factors of Latvia and Slaskie relative to the regional average 
in Eastern Europe  
 
Note: The regional attraction factors are reported as the deviation from the regional average 
in Eastern Europe divided by the regional average in Eastern Europe. Green colours 
represent a better situation than the EU27 average whereas a less attractive situation is 
reported in red colours. ICT data for Latvia are not available. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2006) 
 
Figure 3: Regional attraction factors of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Thüringen and 
Southern and Eastern Ireland relative to the average of regions in the cohesion countries  
 
Note: The regional attraction factors are reported as the deviation from the regional average 
of the cohesion countries divided by the regional average in the cohesion countries. Green 
colours represent a better situation than the EU27 average whereas a less attractive situation 
is reported in red colours. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2006) 
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Figure 4: Regional attraction factors of Veneto and Steiermark relative to the average of 
regions facing weaknesses in competitiveness and employment  
 
Note: The regional attraction factors are reported as the deviation from the regional average 
in the Cohesion countries divided by the regional average in the Cohesion countries. Green 
colours represent a better situation than the EU27 average whereas a less attractive situation 
is reported in red colours. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2006) 
 
Figure 5: Regional attraction factors of three groups of remote regions relative to the EU27 
average  
 
Note: The regional attraction factors are reported as the deviation from the EU27 regional 
average divided by the EU27 regional average. Green colours represent a better situation 
than the EU27 average whereas a less attractive situation is reported in red colours. 
Innovation data for the remote British regions are not available. 
Source: Copenhagen Economics (2006) 
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3. Assumptions 
9 
1, 2=rThe Footloose Capital model involves two countries or regions, , each with a 
monopolistically competitive manufacturing sector and a perfectly competitive agricultural 
sector. There are, in total, L  consumers with a share  located in region 1. Each consumer 
provides one unit of labour per period. Labour is immobile between regions but 
instantaneously mobile between sectors. Consumers are also the capital owners.  
Ls
A key feature of the Footloose Capital model is that physical capital is mobile between 
regions but capital owners are completely immobile and they spend all their earnings in the 
region in which they live. Consequently, our notation must differentiate between regional 
shares in capital ownership: Ks  is the share of physical capital owned by capitalists resident 
in region 1 and tλ  is the share of physical capital located and used in region 1 in period t. 
A representative consumer has the following utility function: 
(1) ( ) ( )1A MU C Cμ μ−= . 
The private utility component depends in the usual form on quantity consumed of a 
homogeneous agricultural good, AC , and on a quantity index MC that is a CES function of 
the varieties of manufactured goods. The constant elasticity of substitution between the 
manufactured varieties is denoted by 1σ >
)
; the lower σ, the greater the consumers’ taste 
for variety. The exponents of the agricultural good and of the manufacturing composite in 
the common utility function – (1 μ−  and μ, respectively – indicate the invariant shares of 
disposable income devoted to the agricultural good and to manufactures; therefore 
0 1μ< < .  
We have one government that provides public services for the two regions , which 
increase productivity in the regional manufacturing sector. For one unit of the public service 
one unit of the agricultural commodity is used; the respective production function is: 
rH
(2) AGH C= . 
Public expenditures are financed by income taxes, the tax rates may differ between region, 
the overall budget is always balanced. 
The agricultural commodity is produced with labour as the sole input, one unit of labour 
yields one unit of the agricultural product. We assume that neither region has enough labour 
to satisfy the total demand of both regions for the agricultural good. Thus, both regions 
always produce the agricultural commodity – the so-called non-full-specialization 
condition. Transportation of the agricultural product between regions is costless.  
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)r
Manufacturing involves increasing returns: each manufacturer requires a fixed input of 1 
unit of capital to operate and has a marginal labour requirement (r f Hβ =  that depends 
(negatively) upon the locally provided public services, where ′ 0<f 0′′ >f and . A very 
simple function which satisfies these properties is  
 ( ) ( ) 11 −= +r rf H A BH , 
where A and B are positive constants.  
Transport costs for manufactures take an iceberg form: if 1 unit is shipped between the 
regions, 1 T  arrives where . Following Baldwin et al. (2003), to compact the notation, 
we introduce the parameter 
1T ≥
1 σφ −≡T  which is conventionally labelled ‘Trade Freeness’, 
where 0 1φ< ≤ 1=, with φ  corresponding to no trade cost ( 1=T ) and with 0φ →
→ ∞
 
corresponding to trade cost becoming prohibitive (T ). The manufacturing sectors 
involve Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition. Given the consumers’ preference for 
variety, a firm would always produce a variety different from the varieties produced by 
other firms. Thus the number of varieties is always the same as the number of firms. 
Furthermore, since 1 unit of capital is required for each manufacturing firm, the total 
number of firms / varieties, n, is always equal to the total supply of capital: 
(3) =n K  
The number of varieties produced in period t in region r is:  
(4) ( ) ( )1, 2, 1 1λ λ λ λ= = = − = −t t t t t tn n K n n K  
As with most economic geography models, the primary focus of the Footloose Capital 
model is the spatial location of manufacturing industry, governed here by the endogenous 
regional allocation of capital, λt , where 0 1≤ ≤tλ .  
In what follows, we complete the model by characterizing the short-run general equilibrium 
in period t contingent on λt , by specifying explicitly the capital migration process, and by 
analysing the long-run equilibrium given as fixed point of the capital mobility dynamics.  
 
4. Short-run General Equilibrium 
With the instantaneous establishment of equilibrium in the agricultural market and no 
transport costs, the agricultural price is the same in both regions. Since competition results 
in zero agricultural profits, the equilibrium nominal wage of workers in period t is equal to 
the agricultural product price and is therefore always the same in both regions. We take this 
wage / agricultural price as the numeraire. Under the assumption of identical behaviour, 
each firm sets the same local (mill) price rp  using the Dixit-Stiglitz pricing rule. Given that 
the wage is 1, the local price of every variety is: 
(5) 
1
r
rp
β σ
σ= −          1p p=          
( )
( )2 22 1 1
H
p p p
H
β
β= = h  
The effective price paid by consumers for one unit of a variety produced in the other region 
is rp T . 
Short-run general equilibrium in period t requires that each manufacturer meets the demand 
for its variety.4 For a variety produced in region r: 
(6) , ,=r t r tq d  
where  is the output of each manufacturer in region r and  is the demand for that 
manufacturer’s variety. From equ. 
,r tq ,r td
(5), the short-run equilibrium profit per variety in region 
r is: 
(7) ,, , , 1
r r t r
r t r r t r t r t
p q
,p q q q
βπ β σ σ
⎡ ⎤= − = = ⎢ ⎥−⎣ ⎦  
                                                 
4 As a result of Walras’ Law, equilibrium in all product markets implies equilibrium in the regional labour 
markets. 
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This profit per variety constitutes the regional rental per unit of capital.  
Consumers face regional manufacturing price indices given by:  
(8) 
( )
( )
11 1
1 1 1 11 1
1, 1, 1 2, 2
11 1
1 1 1 11 1
2, 1, 1 2, 2
1
1
− − − −− −
− − − −− −
⎡ ⎤= + = + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= + = + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
t t t t t
t t t t t
G n p n p T z K
G n p T n p z K
σ σ σ σσ σ
σ σ σ σσ σ
λ λ φ
λφ λ
p
p
 
where 1−≡z h σ  in order to simplify the notation. Consumption per variety in each region is: 
(9) 
1 1
1, 1 1, 2 2, 1,
1 1
2, 1 1, 2 2, 2,
− − −
− − −
⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦
t t t
t t t
d M G M G p
d M G M G p
t
t
σ σ σ
σ σ σ
φ
φ . 
rM  denotes the expenditures for manufactured goods in region r; M  defines the world 
expenditures for manufactures 1 2= +M M M  and 1=E Ms M  its regional split. We see 
below that rM , M and  are independent of Es tλ . From equ. (6), (8) and (9) 
(10) 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
1, 1,
2, 2,
1
1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1 −
⎡ ⎤−= = +⎢ ⎥+ − + −⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤−= = +⎢ ⎥+ − + −⎣ ⎦
EE
t t
t t t t
E E
t t
t t t t
ss Mq d
z z p
s sq d
z z pz
σ
σ
φ
λ λ φ λφ λ
φ
λ λ φ λφ λ
K
M
K
 
Therefore – see equ. (7) – short-run equilibrium profit per variety in region r is: 
(11) 
( )
( )
( )
( ) ( )
,,
1,
, ,
2,
1 1
1 1
1
1 1
⎡ ⎤−= +⎢ ⎥+ − + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤−= +⎢ ⎥+ − + −⎣ ⎦
E tE t
t
t t t t
E t E t
t
t t t t
ss M
z z
s s z M
z z
φπ λ λ φ λφ λ σ
φπ λ λ φ λφ λ σ
K
K
 
For future reference, note that regional and world profit incomes, ,Πr t  and  respectively, 
are given by 
Π
(12) ( )1, 1, 2, 2, 1, 2,1Π = Π = − Π = Π +Π =t t t t t t t t MK Kλ π λ π σ  
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(for the latter use equ. (11)) and world gross income Y  by 
(13) 1= +Y L Mσ . 
The government plans a total level of public services of H . is the fraction of public 
services allocated to region r. Providing one unit of H costs 1 (agricultural commodity is the 
numeraire), the total public expenditures are 
rH
(14) 1 2 1 2= + = +PE PE PE H H . 
The government also decides upon the regional contribution to the financing of the public 
services with  denoting the share of region 1. Therefore the tax burdens of the two 
regions are 
Fs
(15) 1 FTB s H=            ( )2 1 FTB s H= −  
Regional expenditures for manufactured goods are therefore given as  
(16) ( )1 1= + Π−L KM s L s TBμ              [ ]2 2(1 ) (1 )= − + − Π−L KM s L s TBμ  
World expenditures for manufactures are  
(17) ( ) ⎛ ⎞= +Π − = + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
MM L H L Hμ μ σ . 
Therefore, 
(18) ( )= −−M L H
μ σσ μ . 
Its regional split is 
(19) 
( ) ( )
( )
− + − − +⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎣ ⎦ ⎣= −
L K F K
E
s s L s s
s
L H
σ μ μ σ μ μ
σ
⎤⎦H . 
World income (see equ. (13)), total expenditures for manufactures and its regional split are 
constant, i.e. independent of the regional allocation of capital. 
13 
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s
With no provision of public services and no taxation, H = 0, region 1’s share in total 
expenditure  is equal to  E
 E L Ks s s
σ μ μ
σ σ
−≡ +  
When 1
2E
s ≠  factor endowments are unevenly distributed between the regions. In 
particular, when 1
2E
s <  region 1 is poorer (has a smaller factor endowment) than region 2.  
With the provision of public services, H > 0:  
(20) E Es s>      if     <F Ls s . 
For region 1, the expenditure share for manufactured goods after taxation  will be greater 
than the expenditure share for manufactured goods before taxation 
Es
Es , if consumers in 
region 1 contributes less than consumers in region 2 to the financing of the public services. 
If  the expenditure share for manufactured goods is not affected by taxation.  = Ls sF
Finally, equ. (11), (18) and (19) determine short-run equilibrium regional profits per 
variety.  
Crucial for the subsequent dynamics is the relative profitability of capital ( )λtR  given by: 
(21) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 11
1 1 1
+ − + − + −⎡ ⎤ ⎡⎣ ⎦ ⎣= + − + − + −
⎤⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣
t t E t t
t
E t t E t t
z s z
R
z s z s z
λφ λ φ λ λ φλ
⎦φ λφ λ λ λ φ
. 
For a constant  the relative profitability of capital depends upon the allocation of capital Es
tλ  via the so-called “competition effect”: a higher tλ  increases the competition in region 1 
and therefore reduces relative profitability. The competition effect implies a negative slope 
of ( )λtR , i.e. ( ) 0λλ
∂ <∂
t
t
R
.  
5. Capital Movements and the Complete Dynamical Model 
In a Footloose Capital model, the representative capitalist does not move herself, but 
allocates the physical capital she owns between the regions. In doing so, she is interested in 
her real net income (we assume that she takes the level of the publicly provided services at 
home as given). Since all income is taxed and spent in the home region of the capitalist, the 
relevant tax rate and price index for calculating real net income are the ones at home, 
irrespective of the regional capital allocation. Therefore, in this case location choices based 
on real net income and on nominal gross income are equivalent. 
15 
0 1
The concrete specification of the dynamic process follows ideas from the replicator 
dynamics widely used in evolutionary economics and evolutionary game theory (see e.g., 
Weibull, 1997; see also Fujita et al., 2000, p. 77, who points to this fact). Taking into 
account the constraint 1λ +t≤ ≤ , the piecewise smooth one-dimensional map whereby 
1λ +t  is determined by λt  is: 
(22) ( )
( )
( ) ( )
( )
1
0 0
0 1
1 1
λ
λ λ λ λ
λ
+
<⎧⎪= = ≤⎨⎪ >⎩
t
t t t t
t
if F
Z F if F
if F
≤  
where λt  is in [0,1] implies that 1λ +t  is in [0,1] and where 
(23) ( ) ( )( )( )1, 1, 2,1, 2,
1
1
t t t t tt t
t
t t t
F
E
π λπ λ πλ λ γ γλ λπ λ
− + −− = = + − t tπ . 
We refer to 0γ >  as the “speed” with which the representative capitalist alters the share of 
capital in region 1 in response to economic incentives , in particular to a comparison of 
the rate of profit in region 1 with the average rate of profit, given by 
tE
( )( )1, 2,1t t t tλπ λ π+ − . It 
can be transformed into a law of motion depending upon the ratio in regional profitability, 
( )λtR :5  
                                                 
5 Note that – from an analytic perspective – this specification is a good approximation to the discrete-time 
counterpart of the process assumed by Puga (1998) in his core-periphery model. 
(24) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1
1
1
t
t t t t
t t t
R
F
R
λλ λ γλ λ λ λ λ
−= + − + − . 
Fixed points for the dynamical system, which correspond to points of rest or long-run 
equilibria, are defined by ( ) =Z λ λ . Core-periphery equilibria, i.e.  or , are 
boundary fixed points of the dynamic system. A central question of the New Economic 
Geography concerns critical values for trade freeness (or for any other parameter) at which 
agglomeration in either region is sustainable. The so-called sustain points give conditions 
under which “the advantages created by such a concentration, should it somehow come into 
existence, [are] sufficient to maintain it” (Fujita et al., 2000, p. 9). Sustain points therefore 
specify conditions at which the boundary equilibria 
0 0=λCP CP
CP
1 1=λ
iλ  (where i = 0, 1) become (at least 
locally) stable. These critical values are defined by ( )' iF λ 1CP = , with the latter indicating 
the derivative of the first return map equ. (23). The latter condition can be reduced to 
 and solved for  ( ) 1iR λ =CP
(25) ( ) ( )( )
2
0
1,2
4 1
2 1
± − −= −
E ES
E
z z s s
s
φ                     ( ) ( )211,2 1 1 4 12
± − −= E ES
E
z s s
zs
φ , 
where ( )S iφ  indicates the sustain point for CPiλ . Tables 1 and 2 and figure 6 summarize the 
properties of the sustain values.  
In addition to the boundary fixed points, an interior fixed point is given by 
(26) * 1 (1 )(1 ) 1 (1 )( )
2 (1 )( ) 2 (1 )(1 )
⎛ ⎞− + + −= + −⎜ ⎟− − − +⎝ ⎠E
z zz s
z z z
φ φ φλ φ φ φ φ
φ . 
Note that the condition 1−< <zφ φ  is necessary for *0 1< <λ  to hold.6 That is, for an 
interior equilibrium to exist, the two regions should not differ too much in terms of 
provisions of public services within their territory. 
                                                 
*0 1< <λ 2 11 1
  16 
6 This can be easily verified considering that  for 2
− −< <− −E
z zs
z
φ φφ φ φ . Indeed, a necessary 
condition for these inequalities to hold is 1−< <zφ φ .  
Table 1: Properties of the sustain values for the boundary fixed point  0 0=CPλ
Properties of ( )01,2Sφ  
1 z<  ( )01,2Sφ  are both real and ( ) ( )0 020 1S 1Sφ φ< < <  holds 
( )0
1,2
Sφ  are both real 
( )2 1− < <E Es s z 1
( ) ( )0 0
2 10 1
S Sφ φ< < < ( ) ( )0 02 11 S Sφ φ< <0.5<Es 0.5>Es:  :  
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Figure 6: Properties of the sustain values for the boundary fixed points  and 0 0=CPλ
1 1=CPλ  
 
  18 
19 
*
A second central question of the New Economic Geography concerns critical values for the 
trade freeness (or for any other parameter) at which an (interior) equilibrium without spatial 
concentration “breaks up”. This so-called break point gives conditions under which “small 
differences among locations [will] snowball into larger differences over time, so that the 
symmetry between identical locations will spontaneously break” (Fujita et al., 2000, p. 9). 
I.e. it gives conditions under which an interior fixed point λ  becomes (at least locally) 
unstable and the dynamics is attracted to one of the boundary equilibria. Analytically, the 
break point is defined by ( ) 1′ Bφ* =F λ . In our model, the break point  arises when the 
interior fixed point coincides with one of the boundary fixed points and it is equal to the 
corresponding sustain point. At that value of the trade freeness a transcritical bifurcation 
occurs (see Wiggins, 1990). Two fixed points (that is, the interior fixed point and one of the 
boundary fixed points) cross each other (with the interior fixed point leaving the admissible 
interval) and they exchange stability. 
The fixed point may lose stability via a Flip bifurcation, defined by ; it occurs 
if the parameters satisfy the following condition: 
( )* 1′ = −F λ
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( )
2 2
22
1 1
1 1
1 1
− − − − − −+ =
− −
E E
E E
z s z zs
zs s
φ φ φ φ φγ φ(27) − . 
Figure 7 presents bifurcation diagrams showing the impact of trade freeness φ  on the long-
term regional allocation of capital tλ  for (a) z = 1 and (b) z = 0.98. The other parameters are 
set at the values 0.4=Es 10= and γ  and the initial condition is close to the interior fixed 
point value *0 1.005=λ λ .  
  
Figure 7: Bifurcation diagram showing the impact of trade freeness φ on the long-run 
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behaviour of region 1’s share of capital use tλ  for (a)  and (b) 1z =
.  0.98=z
 
 
0.5<EsFigure 7(a) is plotted for z = 1. Since , from the properties of the sustain points (see 
Table 2 above),7 8 it follows:   
(0) (0) (1) (1)
2 1 2 11
= < = = <−
S S SE
E
s
s 1
Sφ φ φ φ  
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The boundary equilibrium  is (locally) unstable for all values of 1 1=CPλ φ . In an economy 
highly integrated (i.e. low transport costs or high trade freeness), in particular for 
 no interior fixed point exists within the (0, 1) interval, and the boundary 
equilibrium  is locally stable. As 
(0)S
CP
2 1< <φ φ
(0)S
1 0=λ 2φφ  crosses the sustain point , a transcritical 
bifurcation occurs:  loses stability; the interior fixed point enters the (0, 1) interval 
and becomes locally stable. At intermediate values of trade freeness, that is, for 
1 0=λCP
(0)Flip S *
2< <φ φ φ , the interior fixed point λ  is (locally) stable. Looking at this interval it can 
be noticed that, increasing *φ , λ  declines. The larger market size favours agglomeration in 
region 2. 
FlipφWith stronger trade barriers, as φ  crosses , the interior fixed point loses stability via a 
Flip bifurcation. Attracting periodic solutions appear, first a period two cycle, then – at 
lower values of φ  – the time path exhibits cycles of any order and even chaotic patterns 
with an ever increasing volatility of the regional shares of capital. For < Aφ φ , the volatility 
that results for relatively high trade costs leads to the concentration of all industrial activity 
in one of the regions. Given the mobility hypothesis as specified in (22), the share of capital 
does not longer change once one of the boundary values 0 or 1 is reached. A core-periphery 
outcome emerges even though both boundary fixed points are locally unstable.9
                                                 
7 Since they coincide with the sustain points, we do not mark the break points in the Figures .  
* 1 1 1
2 1 2
+ ⎛ ⎞= + −⎜ ⎟− ⎝ ⎠Es
φλ φ
*
2
1 2 0
(1 )
∂ −= −∂ −
Esλ
φ φ
8 From z = 1 and , it follows 0.5<Es < and . Given that 
 at * = Esλ 0=φ  and  for * → −∞λ *λ1→φ , the interior equilibrium curve  in Figure 2(a) cuts 
necessarily the 0 line when 0 1< <φ . 
9 A more detailed account of the phenomenon of agglomeration via volatility for the standard Footloose 
Capital model with no government sector is presented in Commendatore, Currie and Kubin (2007).  
( )2 1Figure 7(b) is plotted for z = 0.98. Since 1− < <E Es s z , from the properties of the 
sustain values, it follows:10  
(0) (0) (1) (2)
2 1 2 211
< < < < <−
S S S SE
E
s
s
φ φ φ φ . 
(0)
20 ≤ ≤ Sφ φ tλFor  the behaviour of  in (b) is qualitatively similar to the behaviour in (a). 
The most notable changes occur in the interval (0)2 1< <φ φS
(0)S
. Firstly, full agglomeration in 
region 2 takes place at a higher value of the sustain point 2φ .  
0 0=CPλ (0) (0)2 1< <S Sφ φ φSecondly, even though the boundary fixed point  is stable for  as in 
(a), it loses its stability with increasing economic integration. As φ  crosses the sustain point 
(0)S
1φ  from left to right, a transcritical bifurcation occurs: the interior fixed point re-enters 
the (0, 1) interval and becomes locally stable. Looking at this interval it can be noticed that, 
increasing *φ , λ  increases as well. With increasing economic integration, the productivity 
rise in region 1 – induced by a larger provision of public services – overcomes the 
disadvantage of a smaller market size and favours agglomeration in this region.   
(1)
2
Sφ
  22 
Finally, increasing further φ , as φ  crosses the sustain point  another transcritical 
bifurcation occurs; the interior fixed point exits the (0, 1) interval, losing stability; and the 
boundary fixed point  gains local stability. On the contrary of the previous case, 0 1=λCP
                                                 
10 For  and , the interior equilibrium curve in figure 2(b) has a relative minimum at 1<z 0.5<Es minφ  and a 
relative maximum at min max0 1< < < <zφ φmaxφ , where  and where  
2
(1 2 ) (1 ) (1 )
1 (1 )
− ± − −= − +
E E
i
E
z s z s s
z s
φ E
)
 and i = max, min  
(2 1> −E Ez s sWhen , the interior equilibrium curve – which at 0=φ  starts from  – cuts the 0 
line from above. This is because its (relative) minimum is negative, 
* = Esλ
* 0<λ minφ at . The curve then cuts the 
0 line from below and after the 1 line from below before leaving the interval (0, 1). This is because  
for 
* →∞λ
→ zφ .   
strong economic integration determines a “near catastrophic” agglomeration of capital from 
region 2 to region 1. 
23 
H H
The differences between (a) and (b), which are more remarkable for , follow 
from a small change in the parameter z. The latter depends on  and  – the regional 
provisions of public services – that, in our model, are crucial policy tools available to the 
central government, together with  and 
(0)
2 1< <Sφ φ
1 2
( )1Fs − Fs
s
*
, the regional contributions to the 
financing of public services. The parameter  affects region 1’ expenditure share for 
manufactured goods and therefore the regional relative market sizes.   
F
We leave further considerations upon public policies to the next section. 
 
6. The impact of public expenditure on the industrial location 
In order to understand the impact of public expenditure on the concentration of industrial 
activity in our model, we first consider the interior equilibrium λ . The provision of public 
services in region 1 affects *λ  as follows: 
(28) 
* 2 2 2
1
∂
∂
s
2 2
1 1
( 1)(1 ) 11
(1 ) ( ) (1 )( )
⎡ ⎤∂ − − ∂ −= − − +⎢ ⎥∂ − − ∂ − −⎣ ⎦
E
E
z zs z
H z z H z z
λ φ φ φ
φ φ φ Hφ  
 
It is possible to identify neatly two effects that an increase in H1 could exert on the location 
of the manufacturing sector. According to the ‘productivity effect’, expressed by the first 
term in equation (28) 
 
2 2
2 2
1
( 1)(1 )1
(1 ) ( )
⎡ ⎤− − ∂− −⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦E
z zs
z z
φ φ
φ φ ∂H , 
*λthe provision of public services in region 1 affects  via its effect on the labour 
productivity in the manufacturing sector located in region 1. Since the term in the square 
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brackets is positive for any  and 0 1≤ ≤Es
1
0∂ <∂H
z
*
, the productivity effect is positive on 
λ .  
(28)  According to the “demand effect”, expressed by the second term in equation 
 
2
1
1
(1 )( )
− ∂
− − ∂
Esz
z z H
φ
φ φ , 
*λthe provision of public services in region 1 affects  via a change in the relative market 
size. Since 1−< <zφ φ  and 1<φ , the sign of the demand effect corresponds to the sign of 
2
1
( )
( )
= −∂ −
E
L Fs sH L
∂ −s L
H
σ μ
L
*
σ . Therefore, for , the demand effect is negative on >Fs s
λ . Conversely, for , the demand effect is positive on Fs s< L *λ . For  no demand 
effect occurs. 
Fs s= L
0.5
In order to disentangle the relative importance of these two effects, in the following analysis 
we employ numerical simulations and analyse the following stylised case: region 1 is the 
‘poor’ region, in the sense of having the lower income share without any public 
expenditures. In order to improve the situation in region 1, public expenditures that enhance 
productivity in region 1 are increased. We study whether and how the effect of such a 
policy depends upon its financing scheme. We set =Ls 0.25, =Ks = 0.5=,  and 4σ μ , 
from which it follows 0.46875Es = 0.5Es <. That is, since , region 1 is the poor region 
since it has a smaller factor endowment than region 2. We also set 0.2φ =
*
, L = 1, A = 1, 
B =0.45 and H2 = 0, i.e. region 2 receives no public expenditures. 
Figure 8 summarises the effects on λ of an increase in the provision of public services in 
region 1, within the interval 0 ,1≤ <H L
s 0.5
11 for different values of the regional tax burden 
necessary to finance it, . The solid line corresponds to =F =s s
                                                
F L , that is, the burden 
of taxation is equally distributed among consumers in the two regions. The demand effect is 
nil and only the productivity effect impact (positively) on region 1’s share of capital.  
 
11 H1  should be smaller than L in order to have positive world expenditures for manufactures, M > 0. 
  
 
Figure 8: Diagram showing the impact of the provision of public services in region 1 
*on the interior equilibrium λ  for different values of the share of the tax 
burden necessary to finance public services.  
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0.55=The dotted line corresponds to Fs
1
. The demand effect is negative and after an initial 
range it overcomes the productivity effect.12 Finally, the dashed line corresponds to =Fs
H
, 
the demand effect is stronger than the productivity effect for any  in the interval 
considered.
1
13
The latter result tells us that policy measures aimed at enhancing labour productivity of 
manufacturing firms in the backward region will be effective only if the prosperous region 
participates to the financing of such policies. If the poor region is “left alone” (that is, if 
public services are financed solely by income of residents in that region – corresponding to 
sF = 1 in our simulation study), then the demand effect of an increase in H1 will eventually 
prevail. On the other hand, if the government sets sF at a sufficiently small value, letting 
region 2 tax payers contribute on the basis of their capacity (sF equal to sL or smaller – in 
our simulation study we explored the case sF = sL= 0.5), then the demand effect of public 
expenditures is negligible or it could even act in the same direction of the productivity 
effect. 
We now consider the impact of the provision of public services on the long term behaviour 
of region’s 1 share of capital tλ . Figure 9 confirms the above conclusions. That is, 
increasing  could favour agglomeration in region 1 as long as such increase is not too 
large. Otherwise the demand effect could overcome the productivity effect inducing 
agglomeration of the manufacturing sector in region 2. As shown in figure 9(a), plotted for 
H1
, for  increasing the provision of public services favours the location 0.3=φ (1)S
                                                
1 1, 20 < <H H
 
L12 Note that whereas the demand effect tends to infinity for , the productivity effect is positive but  
finite.  
→H
1−< <zφ φ13 However, note that for H2 < H1 (z < 1) and  a higher trade freeness strengthens the productivity 
effect and weakens the demand effect. Therefore, by increasing φ, there could be an initial range of values of 
H1 for which 
*λ  increases even for sF = 1. 
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(1)
2
Flip S
Flip
(0)S
CP
*
14of the industrial activity in region 1.  For , the interior fixed point is 
locally stable, whereas for  complex behaviour takes place in the long run. 
1 1 1,< <H H H
15
1 10 < <H H  
As  crosses  a transcritical bifurcation takes place: the interior fixed point leaves 
the (0, 1) interval, losing stability; and the boundary fixed point  becomes locally 
stable. Compared with the behaviour of 
1, 2H1H
0 1=λ
λ  in Figure 8, for which φ = 0.2, a higher value of 
φ determines full agglomeration of the industrial activity in region 1 by strengthening the 
productivity effect.  
Increasing further , however, reinforces the demand effect offsetting eventually the 
productivity effect. As  crosses , the boundary fixed point,  loses stability; 
the interior fixed point re-enters the (0, 1) interval and gains local stability. The increase in 
taxation necessary to finance the provision of public services reduces substantially region 
1’s market size. Therefore while H  rises, the manufacturing sector shift progressively in 
region 2. Finally, as  crosses the sustain point  another transcritical bifurcation 
takes place; the interior fixed point exits the (0, 1) interval, losing stability; and the 
boundary fixed point  gains stability. All manufacture migrates in region 2 through 
a ‘near catastrophic’ process of agglomeration.   
1H
1H
(1)S CP
(0)S
CP
0.23=
1,1H 0 1=λ
1
1,1H1H
0 0=λ
Figure 9(b), which is plotted for a smaller value of trade freeness (i.e., φ ), differs 
from figure 9(a) in two important respects: First, the productivity effect is weaker and the 
demand effect stronger. Therefore, when the provision of public services is relatively large, 
full agglomeration in region 1 never occurs. Moreover, full agglomeration in region 2 takes 
place through a smoother process.  
                                                 
14 For  there can be a maximum of three sustain points (and break points): two for the boundary 
equilibrium  and two for 
1H
0 0=CPλ 1 1=CPλ . In figure 4(a) three of them are visible, ,  and 
; whereas in figure 4(b) only one, .  
(0)
1,1
SH (1)1,1
SH
(1)
1, 2
SH (0)1,1
SH
  
15 There are four values of  which satisfies condition (27). In figure 4(a) only one of them is visible, 
; whereas in figure 4(b) three of them are, ,  and . 
1H
1
FlipH 11
FlipH 21
FlipH 31
FlipH
Figure 9: Bifurcation diagram showing the impact of the provision of public services in 
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region 1 H1 on the long-run behaviour of region 1’s share of capital use tλ  for (a) 0.3=φ  
and (b) 0.23=φ .  
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3Flip
3 (0)
,1
Flip S
1
Second, the long-term behaviour of the capital shares is considerably more volatile. The 
first Flip bifurcation value  is much higher. Moreover, within the interval 
, other two Flip bifurcations occur for the interior fixed point. Finally, 
for 
1H
1 1 1< <H H H
10 ≤ < AH H  the volatility of region 1’s capital share is so high that, sooner or later, it 
converges on either  or 160 0=λCP 1 1=CP
                                                
λ .
 
7. Conclusions 
This paper delivers further insights on the impact of productive public spending on 
industrial location, extending results provided by Commendatore et al. (2007) in two main 
directions: confirming their conclusions in a much easier framework and studying the 
dynamic behaviour of relevant economic variables.  
We have dealt with a FC model without investment goods and with a government using the 
agricultural good as an input in the provision of public services. Our main contributions are 
the following.  
First, we have fully characterized the dynamics of capital movements in the model, looking 
at stability properties of industrial location equilibria, under alternative degrees of economic 
integration.  
Second, we have decomposed the overall effect of an increase in the endowment of 
productivity enhancing public services available to firms located in backwards regions into 
two component: the productivity effect and the demand effect. That is, firms are attracted 
by lower input requirements, while higher taxation tend to shrink the local market, leading 
firms to relocate elsewhere. As in Commendatore et al. (2007) the demand effect will be nil 
only if the tax burden is equally distributed across regions. On the other hand, the demand 
effect of public expenditures will be offset by (or even act in the same direction of) the 
 
16 In this interval, the long-term location of the overall manufacturing sector is highly sensitive to the initial 
condition 0λ . See Commendatore, Currie and Kubin (2007).   
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productivity effect if the government let the tax payers of the richer region contribute on the 
basis of their capacity.  
Third, the above policy analysis has been extended to a dynamic context, studying the long 
term regional relocation of capital induced by public spending, letting varying the degree of 
economic integration. In doing so, we have drawn a full picture of the relative strength of 
the productivity and the demand effects under alternative scenarios of trade freeness.  
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